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Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah
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TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah.
By Captain James T. Cobb,
First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour
and Sergeant First Class William H. Hight
First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour
and Sergeant First Class William H. Hight
- TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah.
Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry’s (TF 2-2 IN’s) fire support element (FSE) operated as a mini-brigade FSE during the Battle of Fallujah. The FSE coordinated the combat effects of Army, Air Force and Marine assets more autonomously than the traditional, doctrinal battalion-level FSE.a model of joint interdependency.
Although the FSE did not have joint personnel assigned to it, it worked closely with the brigade air liaison officer (BALO), who was chopped to TF 2-2 IN, and functioned as a “Joint FSE,” if you will.
Ed
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
FSE, TF 2-2 IN, 3d Brigade Combat Team(BCT), 1st ID, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy, Muqdadiyah, Iraq APO AE 09392 (AETV-BGR-FSE), 1 December 2004.
Subject: After-Action Review (AAR) for the Battle of Fallujah
FSE, TF 2-2 IN, 3d Brigade Combat Team(BCT), 1st ID, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy, Muqdadiyah, Iraq APO AE 09392 (AETV-BGR-FSE), 1 December 2004.
Subject: After-Action Review (AAR) for the Battle of Fallujah
1. Background and Mission.
2. Enemy Forces.
3. Friendly Forces.
4. Artillery Fires.
As part of TF 2-
2 IN, the M109A6 Paladins and a
platoon fire direction center (FDC)
were attached in direct support (DS)
to the TF. For most of the fight, this
was their only role. Later, after TF 2-
2 IN had reached its limit of advance
(LOA) at PL Fran, it also was tasked
to support RCT-7.
The Paladins were in a position
area (PA) in Camp Fallujah adjacent
to the Marine Corps and a battery of
Paladins from the 1st Cavalry Division,
A/3-82 FA, that was attached
to the IMEF. This facilitated the FA’s
sharing meteorological (Met) data
and survey and relieved the platoon
of self-security.
a. Organic to the TF. As an organic
part of the TF, the howitzers provided
accurate, timely fires throughout
the fight, delivering 925 rounds,
mostly in danger-close fires. As dedicated
assets to the TF, Paladin fires
were greatly expedited in a 360-degree
fight with fluid targets and a
rapidly advancing maneuver force.
Fire missions took less than two minutes
from the initial call-for-fire
(CFF) to rounds down range.
b. Responsibilities of TF FSE. The
TF FSE assumed responsibility for
coordinating with the TF 2-2 IN S4
for Class V resupply, positioning the
platoon and selecting shell-fuze combinations.
The TF FSE cleared fires
at the TAC along with the TF battle
captain or S3. Clearance of fires was
executed by demanding accurate company
frontline traces and forward observer
(FO) locations at regular intervals
and battle tracking in detail.
c. Role of the Artillery. The artillery
was used in doctrinal roles, such
as screening the initial point of penetration,
preparatory fires, close fire
support and disruptive deep fires, as
well as in non-doctrinal roles, such as
clearing routes of IEDs and breeching
minefields.
Using Paladins directly attached to
the TF gave us a tremendous advantage
in the fight. Our tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP) were effective and lethal
and gave maneuver TFs greater
flexibility, firepower and mobility.
The overall performance was outstanding.
By using FOs and accurate intelligence-
driven targeting, the artillery was
a driving force in the TF’s ability to
attack through a large city with minimum
casualties in six days.
d. Massing Fires. The only drawback
was our inability to mass fires on targets
due to having only two guns. While we
did have general support reinforcing
(GSR) assets, they were slow, cumbersome
and more difficult to coordinate
with than our organic systems. Trust
was also an issue as the vast majority of
our fires were danger-close, and we did
not know the proficiency level of the
supporting guns.
While it did not impact our operations
overall, at times the physical and psychological
effects of massed artillery
fires were the preferred effects. We
could use our 120-mm mortars when
we wanted to mass fires, but additional
155-mm howitzers would have been
more effective.
2 IN, the M109A6 Paladins and a
platoon fire direction center (FDC)
were attached in direct support (DS)
to the TF. For most of the fight, this
was their only role. Later, after TF 2-
2 IN had reached its limit of advance
(LOA) at PL Fran, it also was tasked
to support RCT-7.
The Paladins were in a position
area (PA) in Camp Fallujah adjacent
to the Marine Corps and a battery of
Paladins from the 1st Cavalry Division,
A/3-82 FA, that was attached
to the IMEF. This facilitated the FA’s
sharing meteorological (Met) data
and survey and relieved the platoon
of self-security.
a. Organic to the TF. As an organic
part of the TF, the howitzers provided
accurate, timely fires throughout
the fight, delivering 925 rounds,
mostly in danger-close fires. As dedicated
assets to the TF, Paladin fires
were greatly expedited in a 360-degree
fight with fluid targets and a
rapidly advancing maneuver force.
Fire missions took less than two minutes
from the initial call-for-fire
(CFF) to rounds down range.
b. Responsibilities of TF FSE. The
TF FSE assumed responsibility for
coordinating with the TF 2-2 IN S4
for Class V resupply, positioning the
platoon and selecting shell-fuze combinations.
The TF FSE cleared fires
at the TAC along with the TF battle
captain or S3. Clearance of fires was
executed by demanding accurate company
frontline traces and forward observer
(FO) locations at regular intervals
and battle tracking in detail.
c. Role of the Artillery. The artillery
was used in doctrinal roles, such
as screening the initial point of penetration,
preparatory fires, close fire
support and disruptive deep fires, as
well as in non-doctrinal roles, such as
clearing routes of IEDs and breeching
minefields.
Using Paladins directly attached to
the TF gave us a tremendous advantage
in the fight. Our tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP) were effective and lethal
and gave maneuver TFs greater
flexibility, firepower and mobility.
The overall performance was outstanding.
By using FOs and accurate intelligence-
driven targeting, the artillery was
a driving force in the TF’s ability to
attack through a large city with minimum
casualties in six days.
d. Massing Fires. The only drawback
was our inability to mass fires on targets
due to having only two guns. While we
did have general support reinforcing
(GSR) assets, they were slow, cumbersome
and more difficult to coordinate
with than our organic systems. Trust
was also an issue as the vast majority of
our fires were danger-close, and we did
not know the proficiency level of the
supporting guns.
While it did not impact our operations
overall, at times the physical and psychological
effects of massed artillery
fires were the preferred effects. We
could use our 120-mm mortars when
we wanted to mass fires, but additional
155-mm howitzers would have been
more effective.
5. Mortars.
The Thunder Mortar Platoon
that is organic to 2-2 IN proved to
be the equal of the artillery in this fight
in terms of accuracy and responsiveness
and was an integral part of the
indirect fires used.
When provided the five requirements
for accurate predicted fires, mortars were
every bit as accurate and deadly as
artillery. The firepower of the 120-mm
munitions allowed us to respond quickly
with overwhelming firepower when
needed. During the course of the battle,
mortars fired 942 rounds of timely, accurate
fires.
a. Mortar Challenges. Our mortar platoon
received two M252 81-mm mortars
before deploying to the Fallujah
AOR. These were useful indirect fire
weapons when close fires were required.
The only drawback was they had no
sights. To use them, we had to take
sights from the 120-mm tubes and use
the sights with the 81-mm mortars, taking
two 120-mm tubes out of the fight.
The mortars’ high angle of fire was
preferable for military operations in
urban terrain (MOUT), but there were
times when the mortars’ maximum ordinate
(MAXORD) exceeded the
close air support (CAS) ceiling, limiting
mortar fires.
b. Platoon Security. The mortar
platoon operated outside of Camp
Fallujah at various firing points and
had to pull self-security. It was
manned to do so with no degradation
of fires. The platoon received enemy
indirect fires frequently during the
fight and was forced to displace. But
due to superior training and good maneuverability,
it quickly displaced, reset
and resumed operations.
that is organic to 2-2 IN proved to
be the equal of the artillery in this fight
in terms of accuracy and responsiveness
and was an integral part of the
indirect fires used.
When provided the five requirements
for accurate predicted fires, mortars were
every bit as accurate and deadly as
artillery. The firepower of the 120-mm
munitions allowed us to respond quickly
with overwhelming firepower when
needed. During the course of the battle,
mortars fired 942 rounds of timely, accurate
fires.
a. Mortar Challenges. Our mortar platoon
received two M252 81-mm mortars
before deploying to the Fallujah
AOR. These were useful indirect fire
weapons when close fires were required.
The only drawback was they had no
sights. To use them, we had to take
sights from the 120-mm tubes and use
the sights with the 81-mm mortars, taking
two 120-mm tubes out of the fight.
The mortars’ high angle of fire was
preferable for military operations in
urban terrain (MOUT), but there were
times when the mortars’ maximum ordinate
(MAXORD) exceeded the
close air support (CAS) ceiling, limiting
mortar fires.
b. Platoon Security. The mortar
platoon operated outside of Camp
Fallujah at various firing points and
had to pull self-security. It was
manned to do so with no degradation
of fires. The platoon received enemy
indirect fires frequently during the
fight and was forced to displace. But
due to superior training and good maneuverability,
it quickly displaced, reset
and resumed operations.
6. Danger-Close Fires.
7. FOs.
8. Other Equipment.
9. Munitions.
The munitions we brought to this fight were 155-mm highexplosive (HE) M107 (short-range) and M795 (long-range) rounds, illumination and white phosphorous (WP, M110 and M825),with point-detonating (PD), delay, time and variable-time (VT) fuzes. For the 120-mm mortars, we had HE, illumination and WP with PD, delay and proximity fuzes. We also carried 81-mm HE with the same fuzes.
- (引用者注)PD；point-detonating 弾頭信管; delay fuze 延期信管; proximity fuzes近接信管; cf.着発信管 contact fuse // impact fuse // impact fuze // percussion fuze
a. Range of Munitions.
The munitions at our disposal gave us excellent flexibility. The 81-mm munitions allowed us to deliver extremely close fires to friendly forces while we used larger caliber munitions to engage and destroy heavily fortified houses and bunkers.
The standard table of organization and equipment (TOE) for a mechanized battalion does not include 81-mm mortars, something the Army should examine and correct.
b. White Phosphorous.
WP proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for screening missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes when we could not get effects on them with HE. We fired “shake and bake” missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them out and HE to take them out.
c. Hexachloroethane Zinc (HC) Smoke and Precision-Guided Munitions.
We could have used these munitions. We used improved WP for screening missions when HC smoke would have been more effective and saved our WP for lethal missions.
We had several important targets, often reinforced houses that FOs had eyes on, that would have been more effectively engaged with a precision-guided munition, such as Copperhead with its shaped charge or the developmental Excalibur Unitary round that is concrete piercing (to be fielded in 2006). Barring the use of such precision-guided munitions, concrete-piercing (CP) fuzes would have been more effective than delay and PD fuzes were, but the latter were satisfactory.
d. Ammo Resupply.
The biggest challenge we had was ammunition resupply. The amount of munitions expended was surprising, and we had to struggle to keep our cannons and tubes supplied. The targeting officer at the TOC and the S4 did a fantastic job of obtaining ammunition, but in the future, it would be easier to over-anticipate ammunition needs before the fight and stockpile it.
The Marines gave us what they had, and the location of the Paladin platoon on FOB Fallujah helped greatly. The fact that the Paladin platoon brought a palletized loading system (PLS) was a huge plus. It allowed the S4 to coordinate for ammunition and the Paladin platoon to pick it up.
In the final analysis, it all worked, but I recommend we not put ourselves in that position again. We never ran out of ammunition, but we came close several times.
10. CAS.
We used CAS well in this fight, dropping more than 15 guided-bomb unit-12s (GBU-12s), which are laser-guided 500-pound bombs; four 2,000-pound joint direct attack munition (JDAMs) penetrators; and one Maverick. We also had more than six hours of AC-130 Specter gunship support.
a. CAS Effectiveness.
We had problems with the GBU-12s. At least five duds were dropped, all from F/A-18s. The AC-130 was an awesome weapon, operating at night and prepping our deep battlespace with outstanding accuracy.
The four JDAM penetrators were dropped on a bunker complex with excellent results. The bunker and more than 20 AIF were destroyed.
Initially, we had difficulty working with Marine air. However, once our JTACs learned the system, it worked rather well. An air liaison officer (ALO) from the Marines at the TOC would have helped in the early stages and facilitated the use of more Marine CAS.
b. Pulling Timely Air Assets.
While the Air Force JTACs were useful on the ground, they had limited success pulling timely air assets. A TOC ALO is a must for two reasons: first, a Marine ALO with direct access to higher will pull air assets more quickly and be able to disseminate their fires faster than an Air Force JTAC on the ground. Second, you need an officer who understands the Marine system attached to the FSE for better coordination.
Air assets are requested through a different system than indirect lethal fires. An ALO with two radios tied in to higher and the battalion is a must and will cut air request times in half. Although air was planned, it often was difficult for the battalion JTAC to talk to the RCT-7 ALO and get air when needed.
c. CAS and Other Indirect Fires.
A big lesson is that CAS was not a substitute for responsive artillery and mortars. CAS was most effective in the deep fight, particularly when used on intelligence-driven targets.
11. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
12. Personnel Manning.
13. Training.
14. Conclusion.
The contributions of indirect fires were a decisive part of the Battle of Fallujah and contributed tremendously to the outcome of the fight.
They allowed the maneuver forces to rapidly move through the city with minimum casualties and demonstrated what a joint and combined arms team can do.
The effects were physically and psychologically devastating. Not only did indirect fires destroy AIF personnel, but they also destroyed their will to stand and fight. Indirect fires also positively influenced our forces by demonstrating to commanders on the ground that overwhelming firepower was at their disposal.
The Paladin platoon greatly increased the TF’s firepower, timeliness and flexibility, allowing us to move at an unprecedented pace through a fortified city.
We learned to use indirect fires early and often in large volumes. During the course of the battle, more than 2,000 artillery and mortar rounds were fired and more than 10 tons of precision Air Force munitions were dropped.
However, as successful as we were, had the battle lasted longer it would have been difficult to sustain fire support operations. We must learn from this fight to prepare for the future.
At the end of the fight we thought back on some of the things we were the proudest of. What jumped to the forefront was infantry and tank platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders telling us that the artillery and mortars were awesome. At the end of the day, that is what it is all about: our maneuver brethren recognizing why we are called the “King of Battle.”
Captain James T. (Tom) Cobb has been assigned to 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (1-6 FA), 1st Infantry Division, and served as the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, (TF 2-2 IN) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, including during the Battle of Fallujah. He also deployed with Kosovo Force (KFOR) 4B.
First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour, assigned to 1-6 FA, has been the Targeting Officer for TF 2-2 IN in OIF II, including during the Battle of Fallujah. Also in OIF II, he was a Platoon Leader for 2/C/1-6 FA and, previously, a Fire Direction Officer in the same battery.
Sergeant First Class William H. Hight, also assigned to 1-6 FA, has been TF 2-2 IN’s Fire Support NCO since September 2003, deploying in OIF II and fighting in the Battle of Fallujah. He also deployed to Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and to Kosovo as part of KFOR 4B.
Redleg CPT Jason Bender Selected Aviation Center Officer Instructor of FY04
CPTジェイソンベンダーが選択した砲手 FY04の航空センターのインストラクターの役員
CPTジェイソンベンダーが選択した砲手 FY04の航空センターのインストラクターの役員
