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WikiLeaks Japan: North Korea Collapse ?; 'Going Nuclear'; UN Security Council
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WikiLeaks Japan: North Korea Collapse?; ‘Going Nuclear’; UN Security Council
This is the latest roundup of Japan mentions in a series of JRT posts pulled from the WikiLeaks U.S. embassy cables series relating to Japan.
― From a February 22, 2010, cable classified as “secret” from the U.S. embassy in Seoul summarizing a Feb. 17 conversation between U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens and Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo on Sino-North Korean relations:
Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” — as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea — not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”
On Japan-South Korea relations:
Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses.
― From a June 17, 2009, cable classified as “confidential” from the U.S. embassy in Beijing summarizing a June 16 discussion with an unidentified source about Asian affairs related to North Korea:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that he kept abreast of Western media reports about North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that U.S. experts should not assume North Korea would implode after Kim Jong-il’s death. He said that PRC analysts concluded that the regime would still function normally and discounted strongly any suggestion that the system would collapse once Kim Jong-il disappeared.
ROK has no new ideas - Japan can only scuttle talks
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ROK Six-Party Talks envoy Wi Sung-lac had met with VFM Wu Dawei on June 9 but had offered nothing new. “The South Koreans have plenty of ideas, but we’ve heard them all before,” he complained, adding that the ROK government was too close to the situation in North Korea to be objective. Turning to Japan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Japan’s obsession with the abductee issue reminded him of a Chinese expression for an individual who was too weak to make something work, yet strong enough to destroy it.
― From a January 12, 2009, cable classified as “confidential” from the U.S. embassy in Seoul summarizing South Korea’s foreign policy towards its neighbors:
President Lee has made concerted efforts to improve relations with Tokyo, which were significantly strained during the Roh Moo-hyun era over history and territory issues. Lee sought to compartmentalize what he called “disputes over the past,” stating in an early policy address that “South Korea and Japan should…try to foster a future-oriented relationship with a pragmatic attitude. Historical truth must not be ignored, but we can no longer afford to give up our future relations due to disputes over the past.” Lee’s vision was to look beyond the history-bound bilateral issues and create a Korea-Japan partnership active in the regional and global arena on issues like the denuclearization of the DPRK, strengthening of multilateral relationships, trade and economics, and cooperation on projects like alternative energy, communicable diseases, and poverty alleviation.
So far, Lee’s efforts have yielded some success, although Blue House officials would argue that results would have been far better had Tokyo shown more courage, especially in dealing with the Takeshima/Dokdo issue [refers to the territorial disputed group of islands in the Sea of Japan. It is called Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in South Korea]. For example, Lee pressed ahead with his plan to engage Japan on a more strategic regional and global level. Lee made the decision that Korea would participate in the October U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Policy Planning talks (Ref A) in Tokyo. He then agreed to the U.S.-Japan-Korea Defense Trilateral Talks (Ref B) in Washington in November, the first trilateral defense talks in six years. Lee also initiated the first ever stand-alone China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit (Ref C) in Fukuoka in December. Critics will of course point out that there were no substantive results from these meetings, but the fact that the meetings were held at all is a significant result.
― From a April 30, 2009, cable classified as “secret” from the U.S. embassy in Beijing. The “Charge” refers to Dan Piccuta, who was chargé d’affaires of the U.S. embassy in Beijing at the time of the correspondence:
In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, XXXXXXXXXXXX felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.
And further down the cable , related to overhauling the United Nations Security Council, a prospect that could mean adding to the current roster of five permanent (P-5) members, which currently includes the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K. and France:
China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.
― From a June 4, 2009, cable classified as “secret” from the embassy in Singapore summarizing a May 30 discussion between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg’s conversation with Singapore founder and former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, who now goes by the title minister mentor:
The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.
