Honest Begging: Expanding from Signal of Need
Reference
Mock et al. 2011.pdf
MEMO
親が積極的に給餌を行っている（active choice）とするbeggingの研究に関する総説（その逆はpassive choice。すなわちscramble仮説とnegotiation仮説）。
ここではactive choiceを行っている仮説を3つに分けている
- Signal of Need
- Signal of Quality
- Signal of Hunger
Abstract
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Overt soliciting for parental resources, primarily food, is often explained as having evolved to express the fitness gain a signaling offspring would derive from a favorable parental response. This Signal of Need model makes 4 unheralded assumptions: 1) that parents’ life-history objective is egalitarian; 2) that contemporaneous siblings participate nepotistically; 3) that dependent young can assess their own reproductive value from internal sources; and 4) that the morphological and behavioral signals we call ‘‘begging’’ are essential for transferring such cryptic information reliably. We review 2 parsimonious alternative types of honest begging. First, if the life-history assumption is relaxed, solicitation signals may be positively correlated with reproductive value, obviating the nepotism assumption. According to this Signal of Quality logic, solicitation signals can be seen as typical handicaptype advertisements of personal merit. Second, by relaxing the assumptions concerning cryptic fitness information entirely, solicitation signals might be purely proximate Signals of Hunger, with parents basing their overriding life-history decisions on nonsignal information streams (ecological costs of foraging plus offspring cues already in the public domain). These 3 hypotheses are easily testable, along with existing models that do not require parents to have complete control over resources.
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Outline
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Introduction
すくなくとも3つのアプローチ
Signal of Need
A Short History of Begging and Parental Choice
Problems Surrounding "Cryptic Need"
Dynamic Problem, Static Model
Active-Choice Alternatives To SoN
Testing the Array of Active-Choice Hypotheses
Appendix: The Limited Equivalency of Hunger and Need
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